Two
Essays:
and
Summarizing Thai History: an Alternative Model
{NOTE:
The author's recommendation is that you read the two essays in full; however,
the links in the table below allow the hurried reader to navigate different
sections of the two essays. Links in the top row of the table below are
for the first essay, while the bottom row is for the second essay. Or, to
read from the beginning, scroll down from here, bypassing the table.}
Together, these two essays provide
some introductory information related to the history of Thailand. They are
intended to provide context to what a visitor to Thailand might hear or see in
interacting with Thai people or from reading information prepared for tourists,
foreign residents, international students, etc. Thais have been taught a
particular version of their country’s history—the “official” orthodox
version which has been promulgated for the purposes of creating and maintaining
a sense of Thai identity and national legitimacy. Such a version of
history—whether it is of Thailand or any other political entity—tends to be
an oversimplified political construction, emphasizing a perspective that serves
power-enhancing (or at least power-preserving) goals.
The first of these two essays
draws largely on that conventional narrative of Thai history, although not in as
genteel a manner as is the norm. The second essay directly challenges some
aspects of the conventional narrative. Some information is included in both
essays that is, if not at odds with the popular Thai understanding of their
history (and some of it clearly is), outside the conventions of what is normally
considered acceptable public discourse. (If a chronology of Thai monarchy is not
the reader’s interest, it might be better to skip the first essay altogether).
Some suggestions for further reading are provided at the conclusion of the
second essay.
The object here is not to provide
the reader with “ammunition” in order to refute information shared with them
by Thais who adhere to the “orthodox” conventions of Thailand’s history.
Such a debate would generally be considered unwelcome, disrespectful,
inaccurate, and potentially quite offensive. Many Thais—like citizens of other
nations—take their country’s national image seriously, and take to heart the
nationalism of which the conventional version of Thai history they have learned
is a part.
The object, then, is to give the
reader a mental frame of reference to check against when encountering
information about Thai history--not to challenge the one who is providing this
information, but to provide a broader context within which to consider it.
Kevin
Acers, June 2005
Thai
Kings, a Brief Overview
Kevin Acers (2005)
This
is an attempt to provide an abbreviated history of the Thai monarchy as an
introductory reference for visitors to Thailand. It organizes some of the
political benchmarks of Thailand’s past along familiar lines: the nine reigns
of the Chakri dynasty and (only vaguely) their predecessors. This chronology
illustrates three general phases of Thailand’s development into a
nation-state: pre-modern feudalism, nation-building, and modern nationalism (as
discussed in the attached companion essay, Summarizing
Thai History: an Alternative Model).
The
conventional view of the Thai monarchy is that it stretches back in time several
centuries, tracing its pre-Bangkok heritage to seats of ancient power such as
Ayuthaya and Sukhothai. Here I will limit my premodern discussion to a few of
the “big names” that are typically referred to in contemporary Thai
discourse—some of the kings whose names are evoked as a part of conventional
Thai history (that is, the history that has been taught in Thai schools since
the late 1880s/early 1900s, as compiled by Prince Damrong, the first Minister of
Education. Damrong and his brother King Chulalongkorn created the education
system to propagate a Thai national identity whose central source of authority
was the Bangkok king and, by extension, his heritage. Damrong’s “official”
history of Thailand/Siam was a core element to this identity, serving to
underscore the legitimacy of the Chakri dynasty in general, and in particular
the reign of Chulalongkorn.) Specifically, three pre-Bangkok rulers—Ramkhamhaeng
the Great of Sukhothai, King Narai of Ayutthaya, and Taksin of Thonburi--will be
mentioned.
In
actuality, there were many other pre-Bangkok monarchs who could be
mentioned—the sultans of Malay city-states which eventually became absorbed
into southern Thailand; Khmer rulers who held power over various parts of what
is now central and northeastern Thailand, as can be seen through the stone
structures which stand today in Lopburi, Korat, Burirum, and Cambodia; Lao
rulers of now-defunct kingdoms such as Lansang, which covered much of modern-day
Laos and northeastern Thailand; a dynasty of rulers in the northern kingdom of
Lanna; Shan, Mon, and Burmese feudal rulers whose power and territory at times
included parts of modern-day Thailand; and so on.
Apart
from the paradigm of monarchy and centers of economic/military/political power,
there is social history—the story of the people who lived in this area we now
call Thailand. Agricultural communities existed throughout the geographical area
of today’s Thailand—from north to south—as far back as the 6th
century A.D., and archeological evidence indicates human settlements dating back
some 4000 years on the Korat plateau in the northeast. How these peoples were
politically organized and ruled is beyond the scope of this paper.
It
is difficult to reconstruct a linear history of pre-Bangkok monarchs since there
were actually numerous feudal city-state kingdoms, sultanates, vassal states,
rivals and protectorates throughout the region co-existing at different times.
Should Burmese kings be included as “kings of Thailand” when they held
territory within the current Thai borders under their control? Rulers over 18th
and 19th century kingdoms-within-Siam, such as those who reigned at
Chieng Mai in Lanna and in Cambodia and in Nakornsrithammarat and who, while
autonomous kings in their own right, accepted protectorate status under the
“greater” king of Siam? Typically, none of these past monarchs are
“counted” as Thai kings, although arguably they were as legitimate as the
monarchs conventionally included in the Thai historical narrative.
In
that conventional narrative of Thai history, Sukhothai is identified as “the
first Thai kingdom.” This designation is debatable (but not among most Thais).
Nonetheless, since it is so widely accepted as such, it is important to be
familiar with its most famous king: Ramkham-haeng the Great. Ramkahmhaeng is
known as the second ruler over Sukhothai, which was a political power in the 13th
century and weakened shortly thereafter. Ramkhamhaeng is credited with inventing
the precursor to the modern Thai alphabet, although this may be more legend than
historical. (As a side note, many of the curse words in modern Thai are
linguistic souvenirs from the Ramkhamhaeng era, similar to the Anglo-Saxon
heritage of many English “four-letter” words.)
Some
historians who look beyond the conventions of the traditional Thai historical
narrative point out that as late as the mid-19th century, Sukhothai
was regarded as an obscure and relatively unimportant, largely forgotten
city-state of the ancient past. However, when the “official” narrative of
conventional Thai history was compiled by Prince Damrong, Sukhothai was
resurrected and placed upon a pedastal of sorts, its past embellished in order
to shed grace on the rulers of Bangkok who, it was now claimed, were the latest
manifestation of the glory which Sukhothai was portrayed to represent.
Another
feudal-era kingdom—and the linear descendant of Sukhothai as “the second
Thai kingdom” or “the second capital of Thailand” according to popular
convention—is Ayuthaya. Ayuthaya and Sukhothai actually co-existed for a time;
however, Ayuthaya’s power gradually came to eclipse that of Sukhothai in the
14th through 18th centuries. The most commonly mentioned
Ayuthaya monarch is King Narai, probably due to his receiving the first European
emmissaries to the area during his reign (1656-1688). It was during this time
that the kingdom based in Ayuthaya first became known to the West as Siam. (The
exact origin of this name is not known, and while it persisted for centuries in
international discourse, it was not used by the Thai people to whom it referred
until the 20th century.)
Burmese
and Ayuthaya-based armies frequently clashed over territorial domains, and in
1765, Ayuthaya finally fell to the Burmese. Some of the military elite who fled
soon re-grouped further south. One of these was a general named Taksin. He and
his cohorts—who crowned him the first post-Ayuthaya Thai king—built the town
of Thonburi which, in the conventional narrative, briefly served as “the third
capital of Thailand.” As Taksin et al worked to rebuild themselves into a
force capable of holding its own
against the Burmese, the story goes, Taksin eventually went mad and was
dutifully executed. Whether his demise was rooted in a mental illness or a fatal
power struggle, one of the generals that assassinated him took over the throne,
crowning himself King Chakri in 1782. Chakri relocated the political/military
power center of the post-Ayuthaya settlement from Thonburi to what he felt was a
more strategic location directly across the Chao Praya River, where the small
fishing village of Bang Kok lay. A fortress and palace were constructed there
near the banks of the river in an area designated Rattanakosin Island. Thus
began the Chakri dynasty—that of the current royal family—and the
Rattanokisin Era, also called the Bangkok Era.
Beginning
with King Chakri— Taksin’s successor—there have to date been nine monarchs
in the Bangkok era. They are all of the same family, although it has not always
been through direct father-to-son succession. (Filial relationships of the
dynasty are: Rama I – Rama II, father/son; Rama II – Rama III, father/son;
Rama III - Rama IV, half-brother/half-brother; Rama IV - Rama V, father/son;
Rama V – Rama VI, father/son; Rama VI – VII, half-brother/half-brother; Rama
VII – Rama VIII, uncle/nephew; Rama VIII – Rama IX, brother/brother; Rama IX
– Rama X [anticipated], father-son. (With the birth of the current Crown
Prince’s first male child in May 2005, it can be further presumed that this
infant will eventually become Rama XI, another father-son succession.)
The
monarchs were known, during their lifetimes, by names and titles which sometimes
differ from how they are known today. For example, the nine kings are now
commonly referred to as Rama the First through the Ninth, although this was not
true during the lifetimes of at least the first two kings. King Chakri and his
first successor were not known as Rama-the-nth
except posthumously, and at least one of the later kings rejected the title.
However, since this is how they are most commonly referred to today in both
official and popular Thai discourse, I will follow this convention in some brief
notes on their reigns and their lineage.
·
Rama
I:
King Chakri, a nobelman, general and provincial governor under Taksin, founded
Bangkok and a royal dynasty, reigned from 1782-1809.
Also known as Phra Buddha Yodfa Chulaloke the Great, he and his cohorts
successfully built a political center in Bangkok after losing Ayuthya to the
Burmese; he had been part of the “inner
circle” of Taksin’s brief reign and took part in his assassination before
assuming the throne himself at age 46. He initiated the construction of the
royal Grand Palace and canals in the new city and is known for the creation and
preservation of traditional Thai literature. Most famously, he is credited with
authoring the Ramakien, often cited as
the main epoch in Thai literary heritage—in actuality, it was a Thai
translation of the ancient Indian Ramayana,
with minor changes made in order to place the setting in the Thai region rather
than on the Indian subcontinent. Other priorities included the re-writing of
royal law codes which had been lost in the sacking of Ayuthaya, revisions of
“official” Buddhist tenets, and devising a 3-way power structure with royal,
military, and civil authorities. Through military conquests, he built up a
powerful feudal realm based in Bangkok during his reign, successfully replacing
the fallen Ayuthaya. He died at age 73.
·
Rama
II: Phra
Buddha Loetla Nabhalai, son of R. I., is known as “the white elephant king”
due to his possessing three of these animals which were considered omens of rare
good fortune and prestige. The conventional historical narrative portrays
him as a kind and gentle king devoted to Buddhism, non-violence,
morality, and cultural pursuits including poetry, music, wood carving,
architecture and other arts. His
reign is depicted as being fairly tranquil, allowing for the development of
relative stability, and lasted 16 years until his death at age 58, from 1809-1824.
·
Rama
III: King
Nang Klao, or Phra Nang Klao Chaoyuhua, was the son of R. II and one of his
“minor wives.” There was no
designated heir to the throne at the time of his father’s death, and he was
selected from among the ranks of eligible princes by a royal Accession Council.
He is remembered as being preoccuppied with the nuts and bolts of
administration, economics and foreign trade, having religious tolerance, and
encouraging monks to teach Buddhism in the temples. The years of his reign were 1824-1851.
·
Rama
IV: King
Mongkut, more elaborately known as Phra Chomklao Chaoyuhua reigned from 1851-1868 (immortalized in Western popular culture in “The King
and I” and its literary/theatrical variations; most Thais have been taught
that theses portrayals of King Mongkut are offensive, cartoonish distortions of
a great figure, and the films are not shown in Thailand). He ascended to the
throne after spending more than 20 years in the Buddhist monkhood. His reign
coincided with the rise of European colonialism in Asia, and he is known as
being a skilled diplomat, credited for placating the foreign powers without
sacrificing sovereignty to them. He was an intellecutally curious man, and
occupied himself in studying astronomy, astrology, and the English language. He
successfully predicted the timing of a full solar eclipse, leading an
observational expedition to a remote jungle spot where he calculated the eclipse
would be most visible. He was proven correct, but in the process he contracted
malaria on the expedition, killing him within a few weeks.
·
Rama
V: King
Chulalongkorn the Great, son of R. IV, reigned 1869-1910;
his formal royal name is Phra Chula Chomklao Chaoyuhua. During his
reign Thailand/Siam was consolidated into a nascent nation-state from various
protectorates under a network of feudal suzerainty. The King’s brother Prince
Damrong, was instrumental in helping to consolidate the power of this new kind
of Thai political entity—the beginnings of a modern nation-state. Damrong is
largely responsible for crafting the conventional narrative that persists as
Thai history, for devising methods for the suppression of local identities and
supplanting them with a developing
national identity, including the prohibition of education in any dialect other
than the central Thai spoken in the area surrounding Bangkok. Through
negotiations with French and British colonial powers, clear national borders for
the first time were definitively assigned to the kingdom, and Chulalongkorn
effectively took administrative control of the entire area within those borders,
making his reign a significant period of intense nation-building programs. He
was the first Thai king to travel abroad, visiting Europe and establishing
relationships with some of his royal counterparts there.
·
Rama
VI: King
Vajiravudh, or Phra Mongkut Klao
Chaoyuhua son of R.V, he was the younger brother of the Crown Prince who died
prematurely. He replaced his deceased brother as Crown Prince and held that
title for some 16 years until, on the day of R.V’s death, at age 30 he was
crowned king. He had received an Oxford education in England, and was concerned
about improving Thailand’s education system, writing in one famous essay that
the lack of competent, skilled people was like “mud on wheels” slowing down
progress. A coup was launched in 1924 with the aim of substituting
constitutional monarchy for the absolute monarchy, but this coup failed. The
king spared the lives of the coup plotters, and wrote essays and articles in
which he expressed an open-mindedness to constitutional law and a democractic
form of government. However, Thailand did not see such a change during his
reign, which lasted from 1910-1925.
·
Rama
VII: King
Prajadhipok, or Phra Pokklao Chaoyuhua, was the youngest son of Chulalongkorn
(R. V), and at age 32 succeeded his elder brother, R. VI. He was the last king
to rule under absolute monarchy, reigning from 1925-1935.
He abdicated the throne in disappointment with the military junta which
ruled after their 1932 coup instituted constitutional monarchy. He actually
abdicated in 1933, and there was a period of years when there was no king;
however, the conventions of history define his reign as continuing until his
death two years later. He died in England where he had been living since his
abdication. Far from creating
democracy, the miltary junta had replaced absolute monarchy with successive
military-dominated authoritarian regimes. One of the coup-leaders, Gen. Phibul
Songkram, assumed the role of dictator under the title of Prime Minister and
dominated the political scene for many years. With a virtual a vacuum in the
monarchy, Phibul and his cronies ruled Thailand with an iron first and imposed
concepts of nationalism, identity, and norms of behavior which remain
influential to this day.
·
Rama
VIII: King
Ananda Mahidol, or Phra Chaoyuhua Adanda Mahidol, young nephew of R. VII, as a
9-year-old boy was unexpectedly named king-designate while attending schools in
Europe, where he was born. Due to his age, he never was coronated and
officially, then, never served as king. (He was posthumously given his full
royal status by his successor, the current king.) His father, who died when
Ananda was a small boy, was another son of Chulalongkorn (R. V). The military
rulers (Phibul et al) selected this
child-king, far removed from Thai politics and intrigue, out of the express
desire for a figurehead monarch who would not harbor political ambitions. While
continuing his European upbringing, Ananda visited Thailand for the first time
at age 13, and returned in 1945 at age 20 to much fanfare. A few months
later—shortly before he was to resume his studies in Europe—the would-be
future king was assassinated in his bedroom. While some palace staff were
publicly blamed and executed for the regicide, responsibility for Ananda’s
death remains shrouded in mystery, and speculation is considered taboo. (What
speculation there is has ranged from accidental self-shooting while cleaning a
gun to assassination by foreign agents or the highly unspeakable possibility of
murder at the hands of another member of the royal family).
King Ananda reigned, mostly in abstentia, from 1935-1946. Throughout most of that time he lived in Switzerland, and
the monarchy was represented in Bangkok by an appointee of the ruling military
junta. Under Phibul’s rule, Thailand aligned itself with Japan during World
War II, and declared war on the
United States and its allies. Japanese military forces occuppied the country,
operating Prisoner of War camps (such as the one depicted in the Hollywood movie
The Bridge over the River Kwai, the
setting of which is exploited as a tourist attraction in Rajburi province) and
leading allied prisoners on “death marches” under brutal conditions.
·
Rama
IX: King
Bhumibol, or Phra Chaoyuhua
Bhumibol Adulyadej the Great, the current monarch since assuming the throne at
age 19 upon his elder brother’s shooting death (1946
– present). Like his brother before him, Bhumibol was born abroad (in
Massachussets) and spent most of his childhood receiving a European education,
mostly in Switzerland. His uncle, Prince Ransit, served as Regent while the
future king finished his studies abroad. He was crowned king in May of 1950, a
few weeks after an arranged marriage to his cousin, the current Queen Sirikit.
During the early years of his reign, Bhumibol was little more than a ceremonial
front for various authoritarian regimes. As charitable works and development
projects under his sponsorship became publicized, the king’s popularity grew
to an almost semi-divine extent for many Thais—a popularity which has been
reinforced through school teachings, documentaries and other public relations in
the context of a political climate where any action perceived as disrespectful
of the monarchy is a criminal offense (a legal provision which has typically
been exploited by dictators to threaten political dissidents.) On a number of
occasions—infrequent enough to be both historically noteworthy and politically
effective—King Bhumibol has inserted his uniquely powerful influence into
political crises by quietly intervening during intense moments in the 1970s,
1980s, and early 1990s. Having reigned for over 50 years, King Bhumibol is the
only king most Thais today have ever known. His reign has seen a stabilization
of the symbolic and even spiritual powers of the constitutional monarchy in
Thailand. Reverent appreciation for the king is considered an elemental aspect
of contemporary Thai culture, even among radicals and dissidents. Solidifying
this popular unity is one of the undeniable achievements that King Bhumibol has
brought to the modern Thai monarchical institution. He has created the post-1932
image of an ideal Thai king. During his reign, Thailand has gone through what
has time been an agonizing process of democratic and economic development.
Throughout the first few decades of his reign, the king’s image was exploited
by various military strongmen claiming legitimacy of power, which they achieved
through coups. Since the 1980’s this pattern has been broken with sporadic
periods of relative democracy. Politically ambitious military figures have been
displaced by wealthy career politicians as the “heir apparents” of governing
administrations since the bloody 1992 collapse of the last military regime. As
some observers have remarked, the Military Era has ended and it is now the Age
of the Tycoons.
·
Rama
X (anticipated): Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongk, the only son of R.IX, is poised to
assume the throne upon his father’s passing. In his younger years, the Crown
Prince suffered from a reputation as a “playboy” unsuitable for the throne,
but in middle age his image appears to have been rehabilitated. (This
rehabilitation appears to have become complete in mid-2005. Upon the birth of
the Crown Prince’s first son, the infant was heralded with great public
fanfare as a future king. The current King elevated the baby’s mother—the
Crown Prince’s “commoner” second wife, a former film starlet--to the rank
of Royal Princess (and by
implication, future Queen) by virtue of being the mother of a male heir to the
crown. For years her status was that of “Royal Consort;” she was not fully
accepted because she not only did not come from royal stock, but the Crown
Prince left his royal wife for her, divorcing the woman to marry her, which was
considered scandalous.) Some years ago there was much speculation as to whether
one of the Crown Prince’s more
widely admired sisters might ascend to the monarchy in his stead. A female
monarch would be a first in known Thai history, and is generally considered
unlikely. In another interesting sibling note, the Crown Prince’s older
sister, Princess Ubol Ratana Jensen, lost her royal title when she married an
American military officer. After living for many years in the United States, a
reconciliation was signaled by the Princess’ return to Thailand with her
children where they have lived for the past several years. Her eldest son was
killed in the tsunami which struck southern Thailand in December 2004. While she
is the current king’s oldest child, due to her marrying outside the Thai
nobility—and a non-Thai—she and her direct descendants are not in the royal
line of succession.
The
monarchy has an extremely important place in Thailand’s history and in
its political self-image. There is certainly more to the story, however, than a
succession of kings. To get a deeper understanding, one would need to explore
the details of social and political movements outside the royal realm—peasant
uprisings, religious conflicts, the changing role of the military, the dynamics
of dissidence, international relations, the embrace of
consumerism/capitalism/eco- nomic globalism, and much much more. With this in
mind, the interested reader is encouraged to survey as wide a range of resources
as possible for additional information and perspectives.
Kevin Acers (2005)
Timelines summarizing Thai history tend to be oversimplifications, and as such, misrepresentations, of the process of nationalizing the geographical area now known as Thailand. For example, it is conventional to relate that Sukothai was the first capital of Thailand, followed by Ayuthaya, later by Thonburi, and finally, about 225 years ago, Bangkok. The grossly inaccurate implication is that as a nation, Thailand has existed for hundreds of years, while its capital city has moved from place to place within that nation’s fixed borders.
It is also conventional to describe the “boundaries” of Thailand as having originally encompassed much of the territory currently defined as Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia, with this territory being ceded to European powers in order to prevent the French and/or British colonization of Thailand. Much has been made of the depiction of Thailand as the only Southeast Asian country never to have been colonized by a foreign power.
There is, though, an alternative view to these conventions of Thai history. In this alternative view, there are three phases: the pre-modern/feudal period; the colonization period, which could also be called the consolidation or nation-building period; and the modern period of the Thai nation. (It could even be argued that this last period actually marks the beginning of Thai national history. It might be equally valid to place the “birth” of Thailand near the end of the colonization period, comparable to 1776 marking the beginning of US national history.) (See Table 1).
Feudalism approximately describes the political realities of pre-modern “Thailand” (that is, the geographical region now know as Thailand, which in those days was not called by any such name or by any one name), up until the successful power consolidation projects undertaken during the reign of Chulalongkorn, the king of the Bangkok-centered Krung Siam. In many ways--contrary to the conventional historical narrative--Chulalongkorn was the first king of Thailand (or Siam). His domain, based in Bangkok, expanded through colonization of the geographical area of modern Thailand. Through this process of colonization the modern Thai nation emerged. Thailand, then, is the product of Chulalongkorn’s colonization of the area much more than it is a linear descendant or continuation of the various regimes that had been based in Sukhothai and Ayuthaya.
Prior to
these colonization efforts of Chulalongkorn’s administration during the late
1800s/early 1900s, “Thailand” was a region without a centralized government,
single dominant language, or unified culture. For centuries it was a feudal
society (or more accurately, an array of feudal societies). Numerous kingdoms
co-existed in the area, some in competition for dominance, others giving lip
service (and tribute) to more powerful rival kingdoms in order to be more or
less left alone by them.
These
various kingdoms were, in a sense, city-states that were strewn across the
territory now known as Thailand. They did not in any sense form a unified
nation. They knew of each other’s existence, engaged in trade, battles, slave
raids, intermarriage, etc., although in some cases they ignored each other.
These
feudal entities functioned as radio-station states, to borrow a metaphor used by
historian David Streckfuss. Their political influence was strongest in the
geographical center
|
OF THAI HISTORY |
|
|
1238-
circa 1350:
the Sukothai period, during
which the first capital of Thailand resided in Sukothai through the reins
of several kings. King Ramkamhaeng the Great is perhaps the best known
king of this era, and is credited with being the first to encode the Thai
language into written form by inventing the precursor to the modern Thai
alphabet. Circa
1350-1769:
the Ayutthaya period, in which the kingdom of Ayutthaya was the
capital of Thailand, then known as Siam. Throughout this period there were
military conflicts with Burmese armies from the west; Ayutthaya finally
fell to the Burmese. 1769-1782:
the
Thonburi period, in which a new capital was briefly established
along the west bank of the Chao Praya River. One of the military leaders
was named king, the first in the Chakri dynasty whose lineage continues to
the present monarch. In 1782 he decided the opposite bank of the river
would be a more strategic location, and the capital was moved across the
river to the small fishing village of Bangkok. 1782-present:
the Bangkok era of
the Chakri dynasty, marked by
absolute monarchy until 1932, when a military coup resulted in the
creation of a constitutional monarchy. Political transitions typically
involved military coups with sporadic intervals of relative democracy, up
through the 1990s. Since then, the political dominance has shifted from
the military to the super-wealthy, with tycoons replacing generals as the
dominant political figures. |
circa
1900 – circa 1940: colonization,
with the king of the Bangkok city-state consolidating his powers to expand
throughout the geographical region now known as Thailand, imposing
national identity on the region’s diverse inhabitants through military
action, nationalized education and language policies, citizenship laws,
etc. Through this period of bureaucracy-building and nation-defining, a
campaign of creating national identity to supplant localism was imposed.
The centralized powers, based in Bangkok, asserted themselves as a
national entity upon the geographical region located between the British
colonial borders of Burma and Malaysia in the west and south, and the
French colonial borders of Indochina and Cambodia in the east. With
Chulalongkorn’s colonization of the territory that was “left over in
the middle of these European-defined boundaries, modern Thailand was
established geographically and, over time, politically. circa
1940 – present:
emergence of the modern Thai nation,
in which the myth of Thai national history and identity have been
promulgated in order to reinforce national identity, and in which a
centralized government has been able to become relatively stable and
function as a modern state. One of the more critical, long-lasting acts of
nation-building, whose effects remain to this day, was the definition of a
national Thai culture, largely through the Cultural Mandates imposed by
military strongman Phibul Songkram. Without a doubt, during this period
Thailand has been a country in the modern sense. |
To
continue with this metaphor, a remote settlement lying somewhere between a
number of these city-state “broadcasters” might be receiving “signals”
of varying degrees of strength or weakness from two or more kings’ “radio
stations.” Conceivably then, the inhabitants were claimed as belonging to the
realms of these various, remote entities. They might avoid difficulties by
acknowledging the representatives of each distant “radio station” as being
their rulers, although the actual, day-to-day involvement of these rulers on
these communities was probably non-existent.
It
was not unusual for the ruler of each city-state to declare that their
kingdom’s borders were infinite--that the city-state was the center of the
universe, and the monarch was a universal god-king. This claim can be seen as
somewhat absurd from the modern point of view, when there were self-proclaimed
semi-divine “rulers of the universe” seated at various “centers of the
universe” within a few hundred miles of each other, each carrying on with the
same grand illusion of limitless power, but with geographically finite
authority.
European
colonialism in Southeast Asia played a significant role in the colonization of
“Thailand” by the central Thai kingdom based in Bangkok in the late 1800s.
(The reign of Chulalongkorn’s father was immortalized in cheesy pop culture
through “The King and I.” King Mongkut--who did not bear much physical
resemblance to the actor Yul Brenner--ruled over a “Siam” that was
politically dominant in the region but geographically limited, for the most
part, to what is now called central Thailand. Its powerful “radio signal”
extended outwards, but the further outward it went, the weaker was its
influence. Therefore, in a modern sense, Mongkut was much more the king of
Bangkok and environs than he was the king of Siam as a geographical or political
equivalent to Thailand.)
Many
members of the royal family, under Chulalongkorn, were sent to Europe for
education. They in turn influenced the king to adopt at least the appearance of
“modernization,” perhaps to deter the European powers from taking on the
project of colonizing the kingdom under the auspices of “civilizing” it. The
king was busy consolidating his power in the region, extending his influence to
more and more of the rival city-states which were waning in power--in other
words, he was effectively strengthening the signal of his radio-station state
with the aim of drowning out the waning influence of those other entities, and
eventually forcing them off the airwaves, to further overuse the already abused
metaphor.
Another
way to say this is that, in the shadow of European colonization in Southeast
Asia, Chulalongkorn set out to create a nation. He sought to replace the feudal
system of patronage and its network vassal states, minor kingdoms, tributories,
etc., with a nation-state in the modern sense, administered by institutions
under his control, recognizing his undisputed national authority within clearly
demarkated borders. How he and the ruling elite accomlished this is a
fascinating study in identity-creation, history-invention, power consolidation,
and colonization. Chauvinism and nationalism go hand in hand, and by creating a
nation, he enforced Thai chauvinism (“Thai” in the sense of the dominant
ethno-linguistic group in the Bangkok area). This chauvinism colored the
development of the emerging nation-state that was the embryo of modern day
Thailand.
The
colonization of the area known as Thailand, then, was an expansion of direct
administrative control from the Bangkok region northward, southward, and
eastward. What are now known as the various regions of Thailand-the North, the
South, Issan or the Northeast, and the Central region-were considered extensions
of Bangkok.
The local languages of these regions were declared to be
impure derivatives of the “pure” Thai which happens to be the dominant
dialect of the Bangkok area. The people of the Northeast region, therefore, were
declared to be not native speakers of the Lao language (the same Lao language
which is, to this day, the national language of Laos) but rather of the Thai
Issan dialect. It would be comparable to saying that the language of Parisians
is not French, but a Western European dialect of English.
Ironically,
the official language of Thailand (so-called Central Thai) is the native
language of a small minority of the people of Thailand. Even in the central
region, there are many variations which do not conform to idiosyncrasies of the
officially defined “pure” Thai that is imposed in schools and in the work of
government agencies, a practice which began during the colonization period of
Chulalongkorn and has persisted throughout the current period of the modern Thai
nation.
The territories in modern day Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia which were “lost” by “Thailand” during this nation-building period were peripheral remnants of Bangkok’s pre-modern radio-station state, and the Thai king’s claims to them were no more legitimate than those of the European colonists.
Thanks
to various negotiations with the British and French during the nation-building
period (colonial power to colonial power), Thailand now existed objectively as a
recognized geographical area with fixed borders, in contrast to claims to having
infinite reach and the pre-modern dynamics of suzerainty over multiple,
co-existing radio-station states. A national map could now be drawn, using the
borders of the European colonies in Southeast Asia as the geographical
definition of Thailand (or Siam).
While
it is more conventional to discuss modern Thai history in terms of two
phases--absolute monarchy and constitutional monarchy--in this alternative view,
those can be seen as elements of the transition from the colonial period to the
modern period of Thai nationalization. Too frequently the 1932 military coup
which led to constitutional monarchy is depicted as the end date of absolute
rule and the beginning of democracy. In fact, it was a lateral shift from
absolute rule within a bureaucratic system serving the aims of the royal elite,
to absolute rule within a bureaucratic system serving the aims of the military
elite.
The
introduction of a written constitution at this time is sometimes treated in
modern Thai discourse as a litmus test to indicate democracy. However, the
development of democratic institutions and values since the “democratic
revolution” of 1932 has been an incremental process with frequent setbacks and
adjustments in one direction (toward democratic principles) or the other (away
from those principles). The transitional years between the Thai colonization
period and modern period were rocky ones, at best, for fans of
self-determination and civil liberties.
Under
the new constitutional monarchy, the major political figure of this transition
was military dictator Phibul Songkram, whose official title was Prime Minister.
One of his major contributions to the transition was his own sort of Cultural
Revolution. Through the issuing of Cultural Mandates, he declared certain public
and private behaviors, styles of dress and speech, etc. to be either “Thai”
or “un-Thai.” In a sense, he created many of the social constructs which to
this day persist as “Thai culture.” Through the powers of his authority as a
military strongman, he imposed an official “Thai” culture (which,
ironically, was largely designed to appear “modern” to Westerners) on the
successfully colonized “Thai” people (remember that all people who lived
within the borders of the modern Thai nation were now officially “Thai,”
irrespective of their earlier local, regional, or ethnic identities). Phibul’s
cultural edicts reinforced the Thai national identity with an artificial
homogenity. The idea and language of “Thai-ness” was propogated and absorbed
into popular consciousness, along with the creation of new national symbols
(flag, national anthem, nationalized Buddhism, changing the official name of the
country from Siam to Thailand, etc.).
Thailand’s
international recognition as a modern nation-state during this period is
exemplified by its admission into the United Nations in 1945.
It is in this
most recent (and continuing) period that modern Thailand has emerged--initially
as a “Third World” country, shifting in recent decades towards greater
economic and political status with the erratic but gradually progressive
development of democratic institutions and the rise of consumerism/capitalism
and joining the fray of economic globalism. Claims to Thailand’s nationhood
have not been seriously disputed throughout this modern era, despite occasional
flare-ups of separatist activities in some parts of the country.
Pretending to summarize a nation’s history in a few pages is a ludicrous endeavor. It is, unfortunately, not a rare one. The attempt of this essay is not to encapsulate Thai history in brief, but rather to suggest a deconstruction of its conventional narratives. This is intended not as a substitute summary, but as a framework or paradigm (that loathsomely overused word): a different way of looking at Thailand’s complex historical process of political development. In short, Thai history, rather than a sort of national genealogy tracing its roots back to Sukothai and beyond, can be viewed in terms of shifting from feudalism to nationalism by way of colonialism.
Accessing
additional resources is essential to developing a more than superficial
understanding of Thai history narratives, their political implications, and
their impact on the current status quo. Here are some recommendations as a
starting point.
For
a description of “radio-station state” politics and its implications for
Thai history, see David Streckfuss’ essay, Creating
“ the Thai”: The Emergence of
Indigenous Nationalism in Non-Colonial Siam 1850-1980, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 1987.
For
a collection of essays, including a highly recommended one describing the role
of the official Thai language in helping to create national identity (Antony V.
Diller's "What Makes Central Thai a National Language?"), see National
Identity and Its Defenders, Thailand, 1939-1989, edited by Craig J.
Reynolds, 1991.
For
a Thai academic’s perspective on the dynamics of politically defined
geographical space and national identity, see Thongchai Winichakul’s Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, 1995.
For
a highly readable description of Thai history, see Cornell University historian
David K. Wyatt’s Thailand: A Short
History, 1984. Some consider it an authoritative introduction to Thai
history, although it does take a somewhat conventional approach (including
pre-modern maps of “Thai
kingdoms” and other political entities in the region, with designated borders
that, if not arbitrary, are certainly artificial).